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I. INTRODUCTION
When the Supreme Court of Canada decides a case, it can be
hard to know who has won. All sides have declared victory in
Robertson v Thomson Corp1 recently handed down by Canada’s
top court. By a 5-4 split, the Court favoured freelance author,
Heather Robertson, who sued The Globe & Mail in a class
action lawsuit to stop newspapers and magazines reproducing
freelance articles in online databases without permission (and
compensation). Authors’ groups such as the Professional
Writers’ Association of Canada (PWAC) triumphantly stated
that the decision ‘has upheld freelance writers’ ownership and
control of the work they produce (a fundamental tenet of
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copyright law).’2 But The Globe also said in its statement that it
3
was pleased overall. This is because the decision, for the first
time, carved out the right for newspapers to republish articles on
CD-ROM. Articles reproduced in CD-ROM were seen as
“faithful” to the essence of the original print edition and
therefore allowable reproductions by the newspaper without the
authors’ permission.4
But saying that authors own database rights and newspapers
own CD-ROM rights is practically meaningless because, for
both the majority and dissenting judges in Robertson, freedom
to contract will always trump statute law. Each party
theoretically has contractual freedom, but publishers as the
party with the greater bargaining power dictate their terms to
freelancers, who have little power to demand better treatment.
This decision—sanctioning freedom of contract—will therefore
have little, if any, impact in practice.
Robertson may not conclusively resolve the question of which
party owns and controls future exploitation rights. Rather, the
Court defers to private ordering to clarify ambiguities in new
use clauses that will continue to persist as technologies evolve,
to the detriment of freelancers.
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Professional Writers Association of Canada (PWAC) ‘Professional Writers
Welcome Supreme Court Decision’ (12 October 2006)
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II. SOME BACKGROUND
It is now old news that publishers of mainstream newspapers
and magazines exploit authors’ works not only in print form but
also digitally, on their own websites or by selling them to third
party databases and CD-ROM companies. But this was of course
not the practice before the onset of digital technologies. Before
the 1990s freelancers customarily obtained additional
compensation for translations, reprints, and other modifications
of their work.5 With increased digitization, publishers have
begun to use the digital economy as a new avenue to profit from
authors’ works.
Canada’s Supreme Court decision comes after a series of other
freelancer-driven copyright infringement suits decided in
6
7
8
continental Europe and the US, and settled in the UK. At issue
is the period pre-dating electronic publication (before the 1990s)

5

LA Santelli ‘Notes and Comments: New Battles between Freelancer
Authors and Publishers in the Aftermath of Tasini v New York Times’(1998)
7 JL & Policy 253–300, 262.
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eg in France: (3 February 1998) (Tribunal de Grande Instance de Strasbourg –
Ordonnance de Référé Commercial) tr (1998) 22 Columbia-VLAJLA 199
(Plurimédia). In Germany: Freelens (5 July 2001) No I ZR 311/98 Federal
Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof) tr (2003) 34 IIC 227, 229
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Tasini v New York Times 533 US 483, 121 S Ct 2381 (2001)(‘Tasini’). Within
Canada, there is another action working its way through the courts:
Association des Journalistes indépendants du Québec (AJIQ) c. Cedrom-SNI
[1999] JQ no 4609 (QSC); Electronic Rights Defence Committee (ERDC) c
Southam Inc [1999] JQ no 349 (QBC).
8

A settlement between The Guardian and its freelancers in 1999 stipulated
that the newspaper company (1) stop the practice of coercing freelancers to
assign copyright without fresh payment for their work, and (2) give
freelancers 50 per cent of spot sales for one year; The Society of Authors
(archives, London June 2003). I am very grateful to Mark Le Fanu for kindly
allowing me access to these materials.
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when there were no written contracts; only key terms such as
the submission date and word count were agreed upon. And so,
in all these cases, the agreements were oral and new use rights
were not addressed. Freelancers argue that they receive no
notice, give no consent, and obtain no payment for the
exploitation of their works through these new digital uses.
Publishers maintain that there is no difference between the
media; in any event, because of contracts previously made with
their freelancers they can exploit new uses of such works
through an implied licence. Some publishers justify themselves
by saying that they are investing millions of dollars in these new
technologies and need a “wait and see” approach; others, that
they are digitizing works all in the public interest.9 While the
implied licence point is to some extent a question of evidence
and interpretation, it speaks more fundamentally to the
contractual nature of the freelancer-publisher relationship and
to the ways in which the management of such new uses
challenge ongoing publishing practices, and copyright law and
policy generally. The central issue is whether authors’ contracts,
by which copyright is transferred or licensed for reproduction,
contemplate electronic publication rights.10 For staff writers in
common law countries it is a moot point, since their employer
owns the copyright in the work done “during the course of
employment,” but for freelancers who base their livelihoods on
each new contract, the issue is a vital one.11 In copyright law,

9

De Volkskrant No D 3.1294 (24 September 1997) (DCt of Amsterdam) tr
(1998) 22 Columbia-VLAJLA 181 argued for a three-year freeze before
compensating authors as the technologies were in an “experimental stage”;
on the public interest argument see Abella J’s dissent in Robertson SCC (n 1).
10

Copyright Act RSC 1985 c C-42 (‘CCA’) s 3 setting out the bundle of
economic rights (e.g. reproduction right) to which a copyright owner is
entitled.
11

CCA s 13(3); in the UK, Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 c 48 as
amended s 11(2).
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freelancers are independent contractors and so without an
agreement stating otherwise, they are supposed to control the
future exploitation rights over their works.

III. CANADA’S ROBERTSON
Robertson v Thomson Corp12 was a class action headed by
Canadian author Heather Robertson who wrote for The Globe &
Mail. The Globe entered into a letter agreement with
Robertson’s publisher in August 1995 for one time usage of one
of her works for a fee. There was no reference to electronic
rights. In February 1996, The Globe entered into a written
contract with numerous freelancers, which for the first time
included an electronic rights clause. This clause was later
expanded in December 1996.

IV. IMPLIED LICENCE ISSUE IN THE LOWER COURTS
The copyright contract issues were very much alive in the first
instance decision. Following a US Supreme Court decision on
the copyright infringement issue, Tasini v New York Times,13
Cumming J ruled that the publishers had infringed the
freelancers’ copyright since the reproductions constituted

12

13

Robertson CA (n 1).

533 US 483, 121 S Ct 2381 (2001) (Ginsburg J). Six freelancers sued three
print publishers—New York Times (NYT), Newsday and Time Inc. The
dispute centred on 21 articles written between 1990 and 1993, in which
freelancers had registered copyrights. The publishers registered collective
works copyrights in each edition in which the articles originally appeared.
They engaged the authors as independent contractors under oral contracts
that did not contemplate electronic publication. Under separate licensing
agreements with database and CD-ROM companies, (LEXIS/NEXIS and
University Microfilms International respectively), and without the consent of
their freelancers, the publishers permitted copies of the freelancers’ articles to
appear in electronic media.

6
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individual copies of their works. In Tasini’s 7-2 decision, the US
Supreme Court had ruled that, pursuant to US Copyright Act
section 201(c), the publishers did not have the privilege to
reproduce the stand-alone work but could reproduce the works
only in context as part of the collective work. The US Court
mainly focused on the differences between print and electronic
media and did not address licensing issues which were argued in
the lower courts.14
Robertson at first instance found the licensing issues
problematic and declined summary judgment as there was a
genuine issue for trial. In interpreting section 13(4) of the
Canadian Copyright Act, the Court held that the licence did not
need to be in writing because it did not convey a proprietary
interest: The Globe’s licence was “arguably nonexclusive” since
the freelancer ‘retains the rights to publish and re-sell the
individual work.’15 While the Court did not find that The Globe
had a proprietary interest in the copyright, it left open the
question as to whether there was in fact a licence between the
parties, and if so, of what type. The decision left open the
possibility that the defendant could have been entitled to a
licence in the new electronic uses of the works. Conflicting
evidence could not allow a summary ruling; freelancers were
possibly aware of the existence of an online database long before
1996.16 In 1996, The Globe had arguably merely codified the
existing custom of electronically publishing freelancers’ works
in its new standard contract; if freelancers did not want their
works to be re-used they should have contracted out.17

14

See discussion in D’Agostino 2002 (n 1) 2002.

15

Robertson SCJ (n 1) 77.

16

ibid 160.

17

ibid 164-5.

2007]

CANADA’S ROBERTSON RULING

7

On appeal, the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed The Globe’s
cross-appeal on copyright infringement and dismissed
Robertson’s appeal on the implied licence. The Court held that
Robertson had granted The Globe a valid oral licence that was
non-proprietary and so did not need to be in writing.
Nonetheless, the Court did not clarify the full extent of The
Globe’s licence. It maintained that since Robertson admitted to
allowing The Globe to publish her articles in print and to
archive them on microfiche and microfilm, it ‘had a valid oral
licence at least for these purposes.’18 Despite Robertson’s claim
that she had not also licensed her database rights, the Court left
it uncertain whether the oral licence would extend to this new
medium, and whether the defences of laches and acquiescence
applied.19 Instead, the Court miscast the issues and dwelt on
delineating the differences between the media on the question of
copyright infringement (although it purported not to be
following a US approach). 20

V. ROBERTSON SUPREME COURT RULING “OF LESS
PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE”
The Supreme Court did not settle the licensing issue. It too
focused on delineating the differences between media. It ruled
that reproduction of the articles on the databases did prima facie
infringe Robertson’s copyright. Once again applying Tasini, it

18

Robertson CA [96] [emphasis mine]

19

W. Matheson, Robertson Defence Counsel, Phone Interview (18 July 2002).

20

In making the argument that Canada followed a US approach even though
it claimed not to do so, see G D’Agostino ‘Anticipating Robertson: Defining
Copyright Ownership of Freelance works in New Media (18)(1) Cahiers de
Propriété Intellectuelle 2006 tr « En attendant Robertson : Définir la
possession du droit d'auteur sur les œuvres des pigistes dans les nouveaux
médias » 166; see D’Agostino 2005 (n 1) for a detailed discussion on the
differences between the media.
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adopted a “decontextualization” test. The articles reproduced in
the databases had lost their “intimate connection” with the
21
newspaper and were no longer represented in its context. On
the other hand, in a unique twist from Tasini’s holding where all
media was found to be infringing, the CD-ROM articles were
held to be allowable reproductions as these remained “faithful”
to the newspaper.22 Here the Court’s interpretation of the
decontextualisation test is technology-dependent and its future
23
application is unclear as technology is ever-evolving.
Significantly, the Supreme Court did not rule on the licensing
issues; these remain a triable issue. It merely agreed with the
appellate court that an exclusive licence need not be in writing.24
The Court, however, did affirm that the looming trial, and not
its own decision, would finally resolve such issues. For the
Court, ‘this decision, will of course, be of less practical
significance. Parties are, have been, and will continue to be free,
to alter by contract the rights established by the Copyright
Act.’25 This is a very strong pronouncement on the persisting
power of freedom of contract to trump any statutory-based right.
Publishers have already generated standardized “all rights”
contracts where they own all digital rights. And so, this decision
is only relevant for the pre-electronic publication period where
there were no written contracts and no mention of digital rights.
But even for this pre-electronic period, the Court’s finding that
database reproduction was a prima facie infringement may be

21

Robertson SCC (n 1) [41].

22

ibid [52].

23

Others argue that this poses an “extra” hurdle for right holders to prove in a
copyright infringement suit, thereby changing the scope of the reproduction
right: B Sookman ‘Reading, Writing, Robertson’ (OBA Conference, Toronto
23 November 2006).
24

Robertson SCC (n 1) [56].

25

Robertson SCC (n 1) [58].
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trumped if a lower court finds facts from which an implied
contract allowing reproduction may be inferred. Freelancers may
therefore end up with no rights.
And so the majority opinion, seemingly more sympathetic to
freelancers, acknowledges that it has not even begun to scratch
the surface of the real issue: had freelancers impliedly given
away their digital rights in the first place? Who owns the digital
rights for that pre-electronic time period remains a live issue.

But freedom of contract does not always have the last word. The
Court is only partly accurate here. At least in the UK, which
provided the model for Canada’s copyright statute, publishers’
freedom to contract has been restricted when dealing with
parties with weaker bargaining power, such as freelancers.26 And
where the law failed, courts would often step in and even the
playing field by giving publishers fewer rights in the contracts.27
If such precedents had been considered in Robertson, the
contract issues may well have been solved in the authors’
favour. Publishers, aware of these constraints, may now have
had more incentive to contract for very precise terms for each of
their digital rights. Indeed, as argued elsewhere, courts may do
well to adopt a restrictive interpretive approach and read in no
more terms than necessary to give business efficacy to the
contract.28

26

See D’Agostino 2006 (n 20) 177 discussing the UK 1842 Copyright Act 5 &
6 Vict c 45
27

ibid discussing cases such as Hall-Brown v Iliffe & Sons Ltd (1910–1935)
Mac CC 88 ChD (20 Dec 1929).
28

D’Agostino 2006 (n 20) 167.
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In Canada freedom of contract is subject to an ancient body of
equitable doctrine by which courts check contracts for
unconscionable conduct and terms. English decisions in the
music industry invalidating one-sided contracts unfairly reached
by producers with inexperienced musicians will likely be
followed, and likely expanded on, in Canada29
Nor does the Court’s decision stop parliament—the final
adjudicator on copyright policy—from enacting laws to address
copyright contract issues (e.g. more specific provisions on
licensing). Such issues were flagged in the government of
Canada’s report Supporting Culture and Innovation (October
30
2002) but ultimately have not made governments’ priority lists.
Freelancers are a growing category of cultural workers. More and
more work is being outsourced. New means of technology
continue to be invented and open up new markets of
exploitation and new challenges to today’s standardized
contracts and publishing practices. Allowing full freedom of
contract will mean that publishers, with their greater bargaining
power, will take the greater share of the fruits of new technology
markets, at the expense of authors.
For the Robertson dissent, this last result would seem just fine.
The dissenters seemed to go even farther than the majority in
allowing publishers’ free rein. They mentioned Tasini without
disapproval, where the publishers lost and in retaliation purged

29

Schroeder v McCauley [1974] 1 WLR 1308 (HL); O’Sullivan v Management
Agency and Music Ltd [1985] 3 All ER 351 (full discussion of equity as
applied to freelancers in G D’Agostino Towards a Balanced Copyright
Treatment of Freelance Authors (Bodleian Library, Oxford 2004) (forthcoming
in Edward Elgar 2007).

30
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authors’ works from their online databases.31 The New York
Times has purged approximately 115,000 affected articles. To
avoid a similar purging in Canada that would go against the
“public interest,” the dissenters paradoxically ruled for the
publishers. There is a great “public interest” purpose, they said,
in archived newspapers: ‘these materials are a primary resource
for teachers, students, writers, reporters, and researchers.’32 But
no-one disputes that publishers can copy their newspapers:
rather the issue is whether they can just use individual freelance
articles elsewhere without asking or for free (or violate authors’
moral rights—an issue not raised in the case). Nor does anyone
dispute that archived newspapers serve the public interest. But
this does not mean that publishers always prioritize what is in
the public interest over what is in their shareholders’ interests.
The New York Times proved this by punishing authors and the
public by its policy of purging. The dissent also implied that
rewarding authors is against the public interest a position which
falsely pits authors against the public. If we want to nourish the
public interest, we cannot rely only on private interests. At least
Tasini’s dissent deferred to the US government and said that
these issues merit further study. For instance, there is no reason
why licensing schemes parallel to those in the music industry
could not evolve to compensate authors and ensure users greater
access and diversity of works. Such a creative solution may
accommodate all parties in the public interest.

31

After Tasini, The New York Times adopted a policy to accept only freelance
works for which authors expressly surrendered all of their copyright. The
New York Times forced its freelancers to choose between: (1) whether to
press for compensation, or (2) forego compensation in favour of keeping their
articles in the electronic databases at a time when freelancers had limited
information, since the damage awards were yet to be determined. Moreover,
The New York Times blacklisted those freelancers who brought forward the
claim.
32

Robertson SCC (n 1) [70].
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VI. CONCLUSION
What the Robertson Court left the parties with is a copyright
test that is a “question of degree” and will lead to much future
33
guess-work. Even publishers need more than this for certainty’s
sake. Resolving the live contract issue in Robertson may not
close the door on newer uncertainties in future copyright
contracts. Bright line rules will be necessary to guide both
parties and courts.
As in the past, today, even within Canada, Québec stands out as
a province that has attempted to clarify and protect authors’
rights through legislation.34 Similarly, across Europe, various
laws manage copyright contracts so that contracts may be
arrived at equitably and so that freedom to contract does not
35
undermine public policy.
The government and parliament in common law countries such
as Canada would do well to learn from the past and the present
as signaled by Robertson. They should produce legislation that
avoids courts from having to do their job for them in the future.

33

ibid [40].

34

The Act Respecting the Professional Status of Artists in the Visual Arts,
Arts and Crafts and Literature, and Their Contracts with Promoters (1988)
RSQ c S-32.01 discussed in D’Agostino (n 30).
35

See discussion in D’Agostino 2005 (n 1) on national legislation in Europe,
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last amended by Order 2001-670 of 25 July 2001 (‘CPI’).

